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working paper series 46Abstract
In order to explain the joint ﬂuctuations of output, inﬂation and the labor market, this paper
ﬁrst develops a general equilibrium model that integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment
into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities. Then, it estimates a set of structural
parameters characterizing the dynamics of the labor market using an application of the minimum
distance estimation. The estimated model can explain the cyclical behavior of employment,
hours per worker, job creation and job destruction conditional on a shock to monetary policy.
Moreover, allowing for variation of the labor input at the extensive margin leads to a signiﬁcantly
lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. This helps to explain the sluggishness
of inﬂation and the persistence of output after a monetary policy shock. The ability of the
model to account for the joint dynamics of output and inﬂa t i o nr e l yo ni t sa b i l i t yt oe x p l a i nt h e
dynamics in the labor market.
Keywords: Business Cycles, Search and Matching Models, Monetary Policy, Inﬂation
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, J41, J64, E52, E31
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A classic challenge that macroeconomists face is to explain the cyclical ﬂuctuations of output,
unemployment and inﬂation. Recently, a new generation of monetary general equilibrium models
with staggered price setting, often referred to as New Keynesian, has made important advances in
explaining the links between money, output and inﬂation over the business cycle. However, these
models have a great diﬃculty in explaining the sluggishness in inﬂation and the persistence in output
that are observed in the data. What is more, they cannot explain why demand shocks, such as
monetary policy shocks, should cause signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in equilibrium unemployment. They
fail to deal with unemployment as they assume a frictionless perfectly competitive labor market in
which individuals vary the hours that they work, but the number of people working never changes.
In this paper I integrate a new keynesian theory of money and inﬂation with a theory of
equilibrium unemployment along the lines of the work by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The
model is characterized by two main building blocks: nominal rigidities in price setting and search
frictions in the labor market. To introduce nominal price rigidities, I assume that at least some
ﬁrms are monopolistic competitive and face constraints on the frequency with which they can adjust
the price of the good they produce, as in Calvo (1983). This leads to a theory of inﬂation that
emphasizes its forward-looking nature as well as the role played by real marginal cost ﬂuctuations
in shaping inﬂation dynamics. To introduce equilibrium unemployment, I assume that the labor
market displays search and recruiting frictions and the need to reallocate workers from time to time
across alternative productive activities. Job ﬂows and worker ﬂows between labor market states are
explicitly modeled and can be inﬂuenced by aggregate events or individual decisions. In particular,
unemployment is treated as the endogenous outcome of job creation and job separation decisions
of ﬁrms and workers. Finally, monetary policy is conducted according to a Taylor-type rule for the
nominal interest rate.
I nt h em o d e l ,i tt u r n so u tt h a tm o s to ft h eﬂuctuation in total hours takes the form of ﬂuctua-
tions in the number of workers, the extensive margin, rather than changes in the hours that each
individual works, the intensive margin. Moreover, changes in employment allow for changes in out-
put without increased marginal costs. As a consequence, allowing for variations of the labor input
at the employment margin leads to a signiﬁcantly lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect
to output. In turn, smaller variations in marginal costs induce smaller adjustments in prices. This
raises the sluggishness of the price level to changes in aggregate demand and reduces the volatility
of inﬂation. Finally, the lower sensitivity of the price level to variations in aggregate demand raises
the persistence of the response of aggregate demand and output to a monetary shock.
After developing the theoretical model, I estimate a set of structural parameters that charac-
terize the dynamics of the labor market and on which there is few or no independent evidence.
I follow the estimation strategy adopted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), which can be seen
as an application of the minimum distance estimation. Speciﬁcally, the structural parameters are
chosen so that the impulse responses to a monetary shock of a set of endogenous variables in the
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methodology. While this estimation strategy is widely adopted in the literature on dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium models with money, no other study, to the best of my knowledge, has used it to
estimate at least a set of the parameters that describe a labor market with matching frictions and
endogenous job destruction.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I obtain consistent estimates
of a set of labor market parameters. When previous estimates are available, the estimates that I
obtain are consistent with the previous ones. Second, when I compare the model with equilibrium
unemployment to the baseline new keynesian model, I show that the response of inﬂation to a
monetary shock is signiﬁcantly less volatile and more persistent. The response of output is also
considerably more persistent. Third, the estimated model does a very good job in accounting quan-
titatively for the response of the US economy to a monetary policy shock. The model can reproduce
the large hump-shaped response of output together with the sluggish response of inﬂation. It also
accounts for the large, persistent decrease in employment (the extensive margin) together with
the small, transitory fall in average hours per worker (the intensive margin) after a contractionary
monetary shock. Finally, it explains the transitory fall in job creation and the larger and more
persistent raise in job destruction that is observed in the data. It is important to point out that
the ability of the model to account for the joint dynamics of output and inﬂa t i o nr e l yo ni t sa b i l i t y
to explain the dynamics in the labor market.
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A classic challenge that macroeconomists face is to explain the cyclical ﬂuctuations of output, un-
employment and inﬂation. Recently, a new generation of monetary optimizing general equilibrium
models, often referred to as new keynesian1, has made important advances in explaining the links
between money and the business cycle. Building on the traditional keynesian theory of ﬂuctuations,
these studies assume that there are barriers to the instantaneous adjustment of nominal prices. The
emphasis, then, is on the demand-side transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Although these
models are widely used to explain the joint dynamics of output and inﬂation, they cannot explain
why aggregate shocks, in particular monetary policy shocks, should cause signiﬁcant and persistent
ﬂuctuations in equilibrium unemployment.
New keynesian models abstract from unemployment as they assume a frictionless perfectly
competitive labor market in which individuals vary the hours that they work, but the number of
people working never changes. Even if changes in total hours are interpreted as changes in the
number of people working shifts of ﬁxed length, as in the indivisible labor literature2, this process
takes no time and no other resources. In addition, these models do not allow for any heterogeneity
among jobs or workers. As a consequence, there is no reason why old jobs should be destroyed and
new ones created or why workers should be reallocated from time to time across alternative jobs.
If we want to investigate the eﬀects of monetary policy on unemployment, as well as on job
creation and job destruction, we need a richer labor market structure. Such labor market is one
where workers look for jobs, hold them and loose them and where existing jobs are continuously
replaced by new ones. The search and matching approach to labor market equilibrium, along the
lines of the work by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000), provides a theory
of equilibrium unemployment that captures these features of the labor market. In this paper I
integrate this approach to unemployment into an otherwise standard new keynesian model.
The second reason to study this integrated framework is that labor market search considerations
may help to solve the problems that new keynesian models have in explaining the sluggish response
of prices and inﬂation together with the large, persistent response of output to demand shocks, such
as monetary policy shocks. With output being demand-determined, these models predict that the
number of worked hours varies signiﬁcantly as a consequence of a monetary policy shock. In the
absence of an implausibly high labor supply elasticity, this leads to sizeable movements in wages
and marginal costs. The large variation in marginal costs, then, induces ﬁrms setting their prices to
make large price adjustments and causes inﬂation to respond substantially. The evidence, however,
shows that the response of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock is relatively small.
With equilibrium unemployment, it turns out that most of the ﬂuctuation in total hours takes
the form of ﬂuctuations in the number of workers, the extensive margin, rather than changes in the
hours that each individual works, the intensive margin. Moreover, changes in employment allow for
1See Gal´ ı (2000) for a survey.
2See Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988).
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the labor input at the employment margin leads to a signiﬁcantly lower elasticity of marginal costs
with respect to output. In turn, smaller variations in marginal costs induce smaller adjustments in
prices. This raises the sluggishness of the price level to changes in aggregate demand and reduces
the volatility of inﬂation. Finally, the lower sensitivity of the price level to variations in aggregate
demand raises the persistence of the response of aggregate demand and output to a monetary shock.
A third beneﬁt of this research strategy is that it permits to account for the joint response of
output and inﬂation without assuming an implausibly high value of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of leisure. Precisely, as I discuss in Section 5, I will assume a degree of intertemporal
substitution that is consistent with the evidence from microeconomic studies.
The model that I develop in this paper is characterized by two main building blocks: nominal
rigidities in price setting and search and matching frictions in the labor market. One complication
is that when ﬁrms set prices on a staggered basis the job creation and destruction decisions become
highly intractable. To avoid this problem I distinguish between two types of ﬁrms: retail ﬁrms
and intermediate goods ﬁrms.3,4 Firms produce intermediate goods in competitive markets using
labor as their only input, and then sell their output to retailers who are monopolistic competitive.
Retailers, ﬁnally, sell ﬁnal goods to the households. Then, I assume that price rigidities arise at
the retail level, while search frictions occur in the intermediate goods sector.
After developing the theoretical model, I estimate a set of structural parameters that character-
ize the dynamics of the labor market and on which there is few or no independent evidence. I follow
the estimation strategy adopted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and other studies5,w h i c hc a n
be seen as an application of the minimum distance estimation. Speciﬁcally, the structural parame-
ters are chosen so that the impulse responses to a monetary shock of a set of endogenous variables
in the model match as closely as possible the responses estimated using a Vector Autoregressive
(VAR) methodology. While this estimation strategy is widely adopted in the literature on dynamic
general equilibrium models with money, no other study, to the best of my knowledge, has used it
to estimate at least a set of the parameters that describe a labor market with matching frictions
and endogenous job destruction.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I obtain consistent estimates
of a set of labor market parameters. When previous estimates are available, the estimates that I
obtain are consistent with the previous ones. Second, when I compare the model with equilibrium
unemployment to the baseline new keynesian model, I show that the response of inﬂation to a
monetary shock is signiﬁcantly less volatile and more persistent. The response of output is also
considerably more persistent. Third, the estimated model does a very good job in accounting quan-
3This modelling device has ﬁrst been introduced by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in their study of the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
4For simplicity, I will often refer to retail ﬁr m sa sr e t a i l e r sa n dt oi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sﬁrms as simply ﬁrms.
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the large hump-shaped response of output together with the sluggish response of inﬂation. It also
accounts for the large, persistent decrease in employment (the extensive margin) together with
the small, transitory fall in average hours per worker (the intensive margin) after a contractionary
monetary shock. Finally, it explains the transitory fall in job creation and the larger and more
persistent raise in job destruction that is observed in the data. It is important to point out that
the ability of the model to account for the joint dynamics of output and inﬂa t i o nr e l yo ni t sa b i l i t y
to explain the dynamics in the labor market.
Several recent papers have considered search and matching in a real business cycle model and
showed that this new framework improves the empirical performance of the standard model in
several directions (Merz, 1995, Andolfatto, 1996, and den Haan, Ramey and Watson, 2000). These
non-monetary models, however, are not suitable to study how search and matching shape the
response of the economy to monetary policy shocks. Cooley and Quadrini (1999) integrate a
model of equilibrium unemployment with a limited participation model of money. Their model
is consistent with evidence about the impact of monetary policy shocks on the economy and can
produce labor market dynamics that ﬁt the data. However, their analysis focuses on the cost
channel, or supply-side channel, of monetary transmission and ignores the demand-type channel
due to nominal price rigidities. A recent paper by Walsh (2003), written independently from this
paper, also studies the interaction between price rigidities and labor-market search. This paper,
however, considers only the extensive margin, while I consider the intensive as well as the extensive
m a r g i n . T h i sa l l o w sm et oe x p l a i nt h ed y n a m i c so fh o u r sp e rw o r k e ro v e rt h ec y c l ea sw e l la s
the dynamics of employment.6 The two papers also diﬀer in other modeling aspects. Moreover,
diﬀerently from Walsh, I evaluate the empirical performance of the model based on its ability
to match conditional second moments, i.e., second moment conditional on a particular source of
ﬂuctuations.7 The advantages of this evaluation criterion are clearly presented in Gal´ ı (1999).
Finally, using an application of minimum distance estimation, I also provide estimates of a set
of the structural parameters that characterize a labor market with search and matching frictions
and on which there is few or no independent evidence. Dotsey and King (2001) show that modifying
a benchmark new keynesian model to allow for a number of “supply side” features helps to account
for the large and persistent response of output to monetary shocks. In particular, among these
features, they allow for changes of the labor input along the extensive margin by introducing a
labor force participation decision in addition to the hours of work decision. Then, making the
6Moreover, as I discuss later, allowing for variation at both margins has the implication that the model developed
in this paper nests a baseline new keynesian model with a frictionless perfectly competitive labor market. It is this
property that makes the two models easily comparable. Speciﬁcally, any diﬀerence in the dynamics of the two models
must be associated with the dynamics of employment, which are in turn determined by the dynamics of job creation
and job destruction.
7More precisely, I evaluate the empirical performance of the model in terms of its ability to match the estimated
responses of output, inﬂation and the labor market to a monetary policy shock.
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assume that most of the variation of the labor input over the business cycle occurs at the extensive
margin, as it is in the data. In this paper, instead, I investigate whether a fully microfounded
speciﬁcation of the labor market with involuntarily equilibrium unemployment can account for this
feature of the data without appealing to high labor supply elasticities. Finally, in Trigari (2003), I
develop a model similar in the spirit to the one presented in this paper. However, in that paper I
focus on explaining the dynamics of the real wage and its implications for inﬂation. In order to do
this, besides studying a Nash bargaining process, I also develop an alternative bargaining model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the evidence related to
the response of output, inﬂation and the labor market to a monetary shock, Section 3 describes
the model, Section 4 presents the dynamics of the model around the steady state, Section 5 brings
the model to the data and discusses the estimation, Section 6 presents the results and Section 7
concludes.
2 Evidence: output, inﬂation and the labor market
In this Section I describe a set of stylized facts related to the behavior of output, inﬂation and a set
of labor market variables in face of a monetary shock. More speciﬁcally, I use a VAR methodology
to estimate the dynamic response of the variables of interest to an identiﬁed exogenous monetary
policy shock. The short-term nominal interest rate is taken to be the instrument of monetary policy
and the identiﬁcation strategy is described in the Appendix.
The variables included in the analysis are measures of output, inﬂation and the nominal interest
rate, to which I add four labor market variables. The labor market variables that I include are
measures of employment, average hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction
rate. I include four lagged values of all variables in the VAR. Estimates are based on quarterly US
data from 1972:2 to 1993:4.8
The series for the nominal interest rate is the Federal Funds rate, annualized and averaged over
the quarter. The series for output is the log of quarterly real GDP and the series for inﬂation is
the annualized rate of change of the GDP deﬂator between two consecutive quarters. The series for
employment is the log of total employees in nonfarm establishments. The series for average hours
per worker is constructed by subtracting the previous variable from the log of total employee-hours
in nonagricultural establishments. The series for job creation and job destruction are taken from
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh “Job Creation and Destruction” database. They are, respectively,
the log of the quarterly job creation rate for both startups and continuing establishments in the
manufacturing sector and the log of the quarterly job destruction rate for both shutdowns and
continuing establishments in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 1 reports the responses over time of output, inﬂation and the Federal funds rate to a
8The choice of the sample period is explained by the availability of the data on job creation and job destruction.
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hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate to the same shock. The solid
lines display the point estimates of the coeﬃcients. The dashed lines are two standard deviation
conﬁdence intervals. The impulse response functions of inﬂation and the Federal funds rate are
reported in percentage points. The other impulse responses are reported in percentage deviations
from each variable’s unconditional mean. The horizontal axis indicate quarters.
The results suggested by Figure 1 are standard in the VAR literature on monetary policy. After
a contractionary monetary shock there is a large hump-shaped fall in output accompanied by a
sluggish persistent decrease in inﬂation. The peak fall in output is about 0.4 percent and that of
annualized inﬂation about 0.3 percent. Existing optimizing monetary general equilibrium models
have shown a great diﬃculty in explaining this joint dynamic behavior of output and inﬂation. In
general, they predict a much larger response of inﬂation.






















Figure 1: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock
Figure 2, instead, presents some new results about the response of the labor market to a
monetary shock. First, as we can see from the plots, the labor input adjusts along both the
extensive and the intensive margin. As a consequence of the tightening in monetary policy, both
employment and hours per worker fall. However, while the fall in employment is large and persistent,
11
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signiﬁcantly diﬀerent cyclical behavior at the extensive and the intensive margin. Second, the
response of employment is explained by variations at both the job creation and the job destruction
margin. The monetary contraction causes a fall in job creation and a raise in job destruction. The
decrease in job creation is transitory with a peak response of about 3.4 percent, while the increase
in job destruction is larger and more persistent with a peak response of about 4.5 percent.


























Figure 2: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock
3 The model
The proposed model with nominal price rigidities and search and matching in the labor market has
four sectors. The sectors include the households, the (intermediate goods) ﬁrms, the retailers and
a monetary authority. Each sector’s environment is discussed in detail below.
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Each household is thought of as a very large extended family which contains a continuum of
members with names on the unit interval. In equilibrium, some members will be unemployed while
some others will be working for ﬁrms. Each member has the following period utility function:
u(ct,c t−1) − g (ht,a t), (1)
where








The variable ct is consumption of a ﬁnal good, ht is the hours of work, at is a shock to the disutility
from working and χt is an indicator function taking the value of one if the individual is employed
and zero if unemployed. When e>0, the model allows for habit formation in consumption.9
The preference shock at is idiosyncratic to the individual and is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed across individuals and times with cumulative distribution function F (at).
The cumulative distribution function F (at) is assumed to be lognormal with parameters µa and
σa.10 A high preference shock at causes a high disutility from working.11
The presence of equilibrium unemployment introduces heterogeneity in the model. In the ab-
sence of perfect income insurance, each individual’s labor income diﬀers based on his employment
status. In this case, the individuals’ saving decision would become dependent on their entire em-
ployment history. To the purpose of this paper, I avoid these distributional issues by assuming
that family members pool their incomes and chose per capita consumption and asset holdings to
9McCallum and Nelson (1999), Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano et al. (2001) show that habit formation in con-
sumption preferences is important to understand the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. In particular, it
helps to account for the hump-shaped decrease in consumption together with the rise in the real interest rate after
a contractionary monetary shock. In this paper, habit persistence in consumption is also important to account for
the response of the labor market. Without habit persistence, the larger change in consumption and output (since
output is demand-determined) would occur in the ﬁrst period following the monetary shock. Since employment, as
it will be clear below, moves gradually, hours per worker would ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di no r d e rt o
accommodate the initial change in output. In the data, however, the initial response of hours per worker is relatively
small.
10Note that these parameters do not coincide with the mean and the variance of at.
11Assuming that the idiosyncratic shock enters additively avoids the problem of excessive variation in hours worked
across individuals. In particular, since individuals are identical in all aspects other than the preference shock, it will
b et h ec a s et h a tt h e ya l lw o r kt h es a m en u m b e ro fh o u r s .
13
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βs [u(ct+s,c t+s−1) − Gt+s], (4)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the intertemporal discount factor and ct is per capita consumption of each
family member at date t.T h e v a r i a b l e Gt denotes the family’s disutility from supplying hours
of work at date t, i.e., the sum of the disutilities of the members who are employed and supply
hours of work. The representative household does not choose hours of work. These are determined
through decentralized bargaining between ﬁrms and workers. Therefore, for simplicity, I do not
make explicit the family’ disutility term at this point.13










where pt is the aggregate price level, Bt is per capita holdings of a nominal one-period bond and rn
t
is the gross nominal interest rate on this bond, which is certain at the issuing date. The variable
dt is the per capita family income in period t.14
The representative household chooses consumption and asset holdings to maximize (4) subject
to (5). Furthermore, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), I assume that households must choose
their consumption level at date t with the information set available at date t−2.15 This assumption
is consistent with the identifying restriction imposed in the VAR considered in Section 2, according
to which all variables in the information set of the central bank are prevented from responding
contemporaneously to a monetary shock. In addition, this assumption is necessary to match the
initial delay in the observed response of output. As Figure 1 shows, the tightening in monetary
policy has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on output only after two quarters. The household’s optimal choice of
consumption, then, must satisfy:
Et−2λt = Et−2uc,t, (6)
where λt is the value of an additional unit of income to the household. This equation indicates that
at date t, the household chooses a consumption level ct for period t that equates the expected utility
12The same result could be obtained with a more sophisticated variant of the income-pooling hypothesis if the
individuals insure one another against the risk of being unemployed. See as an example Andolfatto (1996).
13This term is nevertheless important to derive the value of employment and unemployment for a worker from the
family problem. See the Appendix for details.
14The family income is the sum of the wage income earned by employed family members, the non-tradable output of
ﬁnal good produced at home by unemployed family members and the family share of aggregate proﬁts from retailers
and matched ﬁrms.
15As Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) point out, this information lag could also be interpreted as a decision lag.
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In addition the marginal utility of income satisﬁes:
λt = βEt [rtλt+1], (8)






3.2 Firms and the labor market
Firms producing intermediate goods sell their output in competitive markets and use labor as
their only input. They meet workers on a matching market. That is, ﬁr m sc a n n o th i r ew o r k e r s
instantaneously. Rather, workers must be hired from the unemployment pool through a costly and
time-consuming job creation process. Workers’ wages and hours of work are determined through a
decentralized bargaining process. Finally, matched ﬁrms and workers may decide to endogenously
discontinue their employment relationship.
3.2.1 Matching market and production
In order to match with a worker, ﬁrms must actively search for workers in the unemployment pool.
This idea is formalized assuming that ﬁrms post vacancies. On the other hand, unemployed workers
must look for ﬁrms. I assume that all unemployed workers search passively for jobs.
Each ﬁrm has a single job that can either be ﬁlled or vacant and searching for a worker. Workers
can be either employed or unemployed and searching for a job.16 Denote with vt the number of
vacancies posted by ﬁrms at date t and with ut the number of workers seeking for a job at date t.
Vacancies are matched to searching workers at a rate that depends on the number of searchers
on each side of the market, i.e., the number of workers seeking for a job and the number of posted
vacancies. In particular, the ﬂow of successful matches within a period, denoted with mt,i sg i v e n
by the following matching function:
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t v1−σ
t , (10)
where σ ∈ (0,1) and σm is a scale parameter reﬂecting the eﬃciency of the matching process.
Notice that the matching function is increasing in its arguments and satisﬁes constant returns to
scale. It is convenient to introduce the ratio vt/ut as a separate variable denoted with θt.T h i s
ratio is the relative number of searchers and measures the labor-market tightness.
The probability that any open vacancy is matched with a searching worker at date t is denoted






This implies that ﬁrms with vacancies ﬁnd workers more easily the lower is the market tightness,
that is, the higher is the number of searching workers relative to the available jobs. Similarly, the
probability that any worker looking for a job is matched with an open vacancy at time t is denoted






Analogously, searching workers ﬁnd jobs more easily the higher is the market tightness, that is, the
higher is the number of vacant jobs relative to the number of available workers.
If the search process is successful, the ﬁrm operates a production function f(ht)=ht,w h e r e
ht i st h et i m es p e n tw o r k i n ga td a t et. Employment relationships might be severed for exogenous
reasons at the beginning of any given period. I denote with ρx the probability of exogenous
separation. Furthermore, a matched pair may chose to separate endogenously. If the realization
of the match-speciﬁc preference disturbance at is above a certain threshold, which I denote at,
a ﬁrm and a worker discontinue their relationship. The probability of endogenous separation is
ρn
t =P r ( at >a t)=1− F (at) and the overall separation rate is ρt = ρx +( 1− ρx)ρn
t . If either
exogenous or endogenous separation occurs, production does not take place.
Let us now characterize the employment dynamics. First, because job searching and matching is
a time-consuming process, matches formed in t−1 only start producing in t. Second, employment
relationships might be severed for both exogenous and endogenous reasons in any given period,
so that the stock of active jobs is subject to continual depletion. Hence, employment nt evolves





nt−1 + mt−1, (13)
which simply says that the number of matched workers at the beginning of period t, nt,i sg i v e n
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February 2004The labor force being normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers at the beginning
of any given period is 1−nt. This is diﬀerent from the number of searching workers in period t, ut,
which is given by:
ut =1− (1 − ρt)nt (14)
since some of the employed workers discontinue their match and search for a new job in the same
period.
3.2.2 Bellman equations
To make the exposition of the following sections easier, I describe here the Bellman equations that
characterize the problem of ﬁrms and workers.
Denote with Jt the value of a job for a ﬁrm at date t measured in terms of current consumption
of the ﬁnal good. This is given by:












where xt and wt denote, respectively, the relative price of the intermediate good and the hourly
wage rate at date t. Note that the hourly wage rate depends on the idiosyncratic realization of the
preference shock. The current value of the job is simply equal to the proﬁts: xtf (ht) − wt (at)ht.
The future expected present value of the job, instead, can be explained as follows. Next period,
with probability 1−ρt+1 the match is not severed. In this event the ﬁrm obtains the future expected
value of a job, where the expected value is conditional on having the preference shock at+1 below
the separation threshold at+1. With probability ρt+1, instead, the match is discontinued in t +1
and the ﬁrm obtains a future value equal to zero. Finally, the expected future value of the job is
discounted according to the factor βt+1, where βt+s =
βsλt+s
λt .17
Denote with Vt the value of an open vacancy for a ﬁrm at date t expressed in terms of current




the vacancy is ﬁlled in t and it is not discontinued in
t +1 . In this case the vacancy obtains the future expected value of a job. With probability 1 − qt
the vacancy remains open with future value Vt+1. Finally, with probability qtρt+1 the vacancy is
ﬁlled in t but the new match is discontinued in t+1. In this case the future value is zero. Denoting

















¢ +( 1− qt)Vt+1

, (16)
17The use of this discount factor eﬀectively evaluates proﬁts in terms of the values attached to them by the
households, who ultimately own ﬁrms.
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λt is the utility cost expressed in terms of current consumption.
Denote now with Wt and Ut, respectively, the employment and the unemployment value for a
worker at date t expressed in terms of current consumption.18 Consider ﬁrst the situation of an
employed worker. The current value of employment is the labor income net of the labor disutility.
Next period, with probability 1 − ρt+1 the match is continued and the worker obtains the future
expected value of employment. In contrast, with probability ρt+1 the match is severed and the
worker becomes unemployed with future value Ut+1. Therefore, Wt can be written as:





















λt is the disutility from supplying hours of work expressed in terms of current consump-
tion.
Finally, consider the situation of an unemployed worker. His current value is equal to the
beneﬁt b from being unemployed. I assume that each unemployed individual produces at home





w o r k e ri sm a t c h e dw i t haﬁrm in period t and continues in the match in t +1 . I nt h i sc a s eh e
obtains the future expected value of being employed. With probability 1−st +stρt+1, instead, the
worker remains in the unemployment pool. Therefore, Ut is given by:

















In this Section I study the opening of new vacancies. Note that opening a new vacancy is not job
creation. Job creation takes place when a ﬁrm with a vacant job and an unemployed worker meet
and agree to form a match.
As long as the value of a vacancy Vt is greater than zero, ﬁrms will open new vacancies. In
this case, however, as the number of vacancies increases, the probability qt that any open vacancy
ﬁnds a suitable worker decreases. A lower probability of ﬁlling a vacancy reduces the attractiveness
of recruitment activities, thus decreasing the value of an open vacancy. In equilibrium, free entry
ensures that Vt = 0 at any time t. Furthermore, I make a similar timing assumption as for the
choice of consumption. I assume that ﬁrms must choose the vacancies v at date t on the basis
of the information available at date t − 2. Hence, from (16) the condition for the posting of new
vacancies is:
18Because there is perfect income insurance it is not straightforward to deﬁne these values. In the Appendix Wt
and Ut are derived from the family problem.
18
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Noting that 1/qt is the expected duration of an open vacancy, equation (19) simply says that in
equilibrium the expected cost of hiring a worker is equal to the expected value of a match.























where the variable e πt (at) is the proﬁts of the ﬁrm at date t.
For simplicity, assume for a moment that vacancies at time t are chosen on the basis of the
information available at time t.19 Then, equation (20) implies that, holding constant λt, a decrease
in the sum of expected future proﬁts must be associated with an increase in qt. Given the speciﬁ-
cation of the matching function, this requires either a decrease in the number of vacancies posted,
vt, or an increase in the number of searching workers, ut. If job destruction was exogenous, the
number of searching workers would not change together with the number of vacancies, but only the
following period. In this case, the increase in qt would be unambiguously associated with a fall in
vt. The decrease in the number of posted vacancies, in turn, would cause a decrease in next period
employment, nt+1. With endogenous job destruction, instead, the number of searching workers
changes together with the number of vacancies. In particular, if the decrease in proﬁts is caused by
a persistent contractionary aggregate shock, as I discuss below, the job destruction rate ρt is likely
to increase and so is the number of workers searching for a job, ut. However, unless the increase
in the number of searching workers is extremely large, the raise in qt will be associated with a fall
in vt. Monetary policy shocks will aﬀect the rate at which vacancies are posted and, consequently,
employment through the above mechanism. A persistent raise in the nominal interest rate, which
results in an increase in the real interest rate due to price rigidities, modiﬁes the aggregate con-
sumption behavior of the households and diminishes current and future aggregate demand. Since
monopolistic competitive retailers produce to meet demand, this reduces their current and future
demand for intermediate goods, which they use as inputs. The resulting persistent decrease in the
relative price of intermediate goods, xt,l e a d st oaf a l li nﬁrms’ expected future proﬁts. The fall in
proﬁts, ﬁnally, decreases the number of posted vacancies and reduces employment next period.
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February 2004Now, the consideration of the timing assumption has the only implication that a monetary
shock at date t will aﬀect the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy and the number of posted vacancies
at time t + 2, rather than at time t. The above transmission mechanism is unchanged.






















In equilibrium, matched ﬁrms and workers obtain from the match a total return that is strictly
higher than the expected return of unmatched ﬁrms and workers. The reason is that if the ﬁrm
and the worker separate, each will have to go through an expensive and time-consuming process
of search before meeting another partner. Hence a realized job match needs to share this pure
economic rent which is equal to the sum of expected search costs for the ﬁrm and the worker. The
most natural way to do this is through bargaining.
Bargaining takes place along two dimensions, the real wage and the hours of work. I assume
Nash bargaining. That is, the outcome of the bargaining process maximizes the weighted product
of the parties’ surpluses from employment:
(Wt (at) − Ut)
η (Jt (at) − Vt)
1−η , (22)
where the ﬁrst term in brackets is the worker’s surplus, the second is the ﬁrm’s surplus, and η
reﬂects the parties’ relative bargaining power, other than the one implied by the “threat points”
Ut and Vt.20
Because the ﬁrm and the worker bargain simultaneously about wages and hours, the outcome
is (privately) eﬃcient and the wage plays only a distributive role.21 The Nash bargaining model,
in eﬀect, is equivalent to one where hours are chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the match,
while the wage is set to split that surplus according to the parameter η.
Together the ﬁrm and the worker choose the wage wt and the hours of work ht to maximize
(22), taking as given the relative price xt.
The wage wt chosen by the match satisﬁes the optimality condition:
ηJt (at)=( 1− η)(Wt (at) − Ut). (23)
20Iw i l lt r e a tη as a constant parameter strictly between 0 and 1.
21It must be emphasized that the outcome predicted by the Nash bargaining model is generally not eﬃcient from
the viewpoint of society as a whole.
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 304
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according to the parameter η.T os e ew h y ,l e tSt (at)=Wt (at)−Ut + Jt (at) denote the total surplus
from a match. Finally, from (23) we obtain Wt (at) − Ut = ηSt (at)a n dJt (at)=( 1− η)St (at).
Although (23) explicitly takes into account the dynamic implications of the match, it can be
rewritten as a wage equation that only includes contemporaneous variables. To this purpose,
substitute (15), (17) and (18) into (23), using also (19) and (24). This gives the following wage
equation:















Finally, replacing the expressions for f(ht)a n dg(ht,a t) and using the fact that st
qt = θt from (11)
and (12), I obtain:



















which can be interpreted as follows. The wage shares costs and beneﬁts from the activity of the
match according to the parameter η. In particular, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side indicates
that the worker is rewarded for a fraction η of both the ﬁrm’s revenues and the saving of hiring
costs that the ﬁrm enjoys when a job is created22. The second term indicates that the worker is
compensated for a fraction 1−η of both the disutility he suﬀers from supplying hours of work and
the foregone beneﬁt from unemployment. Note that a high preference shock at causes a high wage.
In a frictionless perfectly competitive labor market, the wage would equal the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure. With bargaining and equilibrium unemployment
the wage does not equal (although is related to) the marginal rate of substitution. In particular,
from (25) the wage also depends on the state of the labor market as it is measured by the exit
rate from unemployment or the labor market tightness, θt. In a tight labor market, knowing that
ﬁnding another job is likely to be easy, workers will only accept a higher wage. Conversely, in a
depressed labor market they will be willing to settle for a lower wage. The level of the beneﬁtf r o m
unemployment aﬀects the equilibrium wage through a similar channel: the higher the beneﬁt, the
lower the cost of being unemployed and the higher the bargained wage. The bargained wage, then,
will behave quite diﬀerently from the competitive wage.
Let us now turn to the determination of hours. The hours of work, ht, chosen by the match







=( 1− η)(Wt (at) − Ut)(xtfh(ht) − wt (at)), (26)
22The term
κ
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where the value of the marginal product of labor is equated to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition determining the hours worked is
exactly the same as in a competitive labor market. This happens because the correct measure of
labor costs to the ﬁrm is the marginal rate of substitution, rather than the wage. In other words,
the wage only plays a distributive role.







where optimal hours do not depend on the realization of the preference shock. Note also that, as
previously mentioned, the choice of hours that solves the bargaining problem also maximizes the
joint surplus.
3.2.5 Endogenous separation
In this Section I study the separation decision of a ﬁrm-worker pair. A successful match is endoge-
nously discontinued whenever the realization of the preference shock makes the value of the joint
surplus of the match equal to zero or negative. The condition that implicitly deﬁnes the threshold
value at is St(at) = 0. Because the ﬁrm and the worker share the joint surplus according to the
bargaining power η, St(at) = 0 if and only if Jt(at)=Wt(at) − Ut =0 . Thus, the job destruction
condition can be written as Jt(at)=0 . In addition, I assume that ﬁrms and workers must decide









For simplicity, assume for a moment that ﬁrms and workers decide whether to separate in t on the
basis of the information available at time t. Then, equation (29) implies that a fall in the expected
future proﬁts, i.e., a decrease in κ
λtqt, must be associated with an increase in expected proﬁts at t
evaluated at at. If the decrease in expected future proﬁts is caused by a persistent contractionary
aggregate shock, current proﬁts at any given realization of the preference shock are likely to fall
as well. In this case, the increase in e πt (at) requires a decrease in at. Monetary policy shocks
will aﬀect the separation decision of ﬁrms and workers and, consequently, employment through
the above mechanism. As previously discussed, a persistent increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces current and future expected proﬁts at any given level of at. This, in turn, decreases the
value of at above which the ﬁrm and the worker decide to separate. A lower threshold at raises the
22
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the same period. Finally, taking into account the timing assumption has the only implication that
a monetary shock at date t will only aﬀect the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock and the
separation rate at time t + 2. The transmission mechanism is again unchanged.
3.2.6 Job creation, job destruction and employment
Id e ﬁne labor market ﬂows following den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). They begin with
the observation that ﬂows of workers out of employment relationships are larger than ﬂows of
jobs out of ﬁrms. This implies that a fraction of the ﬁrms experiencing separations from workers
must attempt to reﬁll the jobs left vacant and be successful at doing it within the same period.
To take this observation into account, they assume that ﬁrms experiencing exogenous separations
immediately repost the resulting vacancies, while ﬁrms experiencing endogenous separations do
not. This implies that ρxnt separations are reposted and qtρxnt separations are reﬁlled within the
same period. Finally, they assume that a job is neither created or destroyed by a ﬁrm that both
looses and gains a worker in the same period.
Job creation, then, is deﬁned to be equal to the number of newly-created matches net of the





Job destruction, in turn, is deﬁned as the total number of separations net of the number of
separations that are reposted and successfully reﬁlled. The job destruction rate is given by:
jdt = ρt − qtρx (31)
Employment variation, ﬁnally, is the outcome of job creation and job separation decisions of
ﬁrms and workers. Substituting (30) and (31) into (13) and rearranging, I obtain:
nt+1 − nt
nt
= jct − jdt. (32)
3.3 Retailers and price setting
There is a continuum of monopolistic competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit interval. Retail-
ers do nothing other than buy intermediate goods from ﬁrms, diﬀerentiate them with a technology
that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, then re-sell them to
the households.
Let yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i and let pit be the nominal sale price. Final
goods, denoted with yt, are the following composite of individual retail goods:
23
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where ε, which is assumed to be greater than one, is the elasticity of substitution across the
diﬀerentiated retail goods.
Given the index (33) that aggregates individual retail goods into ﬁnal goods, the demand curve







The aggregate price index, which is deﬁned as the minimum expenditure required to purchase retail









As in Calvo (1983), I assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price with a
ﬁxed probability 1−ϕ that is independent of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. This
assumption implies that prices are ﬁx e do na v e r a g ef o r 1
1−ϕ periods.23 Moreover, consistently with
the identiﬁcation assumption made in the VAR analysis, I assume that the retailers who get to
change their prices at date t must decide on the basis of the information available at date t − 2.
Finally, I follow Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Amato and Laubach (2000) by assuming that there are
two types of retailers that diﬀer in the way they reset prices. A fraction 1−ω of the retailers, which
are referred to as “forward-looking”, set prices optimally, given the restriction on the frequency
with which they can adjust their price. The remaining fraction ω of the retailers, which are referred
to as “backward-looking”, instead follow a simple rule of thumb.
The average price of the retailers that do not adjust their price can be shown to be simply pt−1.








where pt is the average of the newly reset prices at date t.L e tp
f
t be the price set by the forward-
looking retailers and pb
t the price set by the backward-looking retailers. The average price pt may
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given the demand for the good they produce and under the hypothesis that the price they set at











where yit,t+s denotes the demand for good i at date t + s conditional on the price set at date t.
Note that the relative price of intermediate goods, xt, coincides with the real marginal cost faced
by retailers.










where µ = ε
ε−1 is the ﬂexible-price markup and xn
t = ptxt is the nominal marginal cost at date t.







where Rit,t+s denotes revenues from good i at time t+s conditional on the price set at date t. Thus,
a forward-looking retailer sets its price equal to a markup µ over a weighted average of expected
future marginal costs, where the weights represent the relative proportion of expected discounted
revenues at each future date.24
Backward-looking retailers are assumed to obey the following rule of thumb, as in Gal´ ı and
Gertler (1999):
pb
t =( 1+πt−1)pt−1, (41)
where πt is the inﬂation rate at time t. That is, they set their price equal to the average of the last
period reset prices, pt−1, after applying a correction for inﬂation. It can be shown that there are
not persistent deviations of the rule of thumb from the optimal pricing behavior.
Finally, the model is closed by imposing the economy-wide resource constraint
ct = yt, (42)
and the market clearing condition in the intermediate good sector
yt = nt (1 − ρt)f(ht), (43)
24In the limiting case in which retailers are allowed to reset their price every period (ϕ = 0), equation (39) reduces
to the standard condition that the price is a constant markup over the nominal marginal cost.
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February 2004where yt is aggregate demand, nt (1 − ρt)i st h en u m b e ro fﬁrms actually producing in t and f(ht)
is each ﬁrm’s production.
3.4 Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy using the short-term nominal interest rate as
the policy instrument and lets the nominal amount of money adjusting accordingly. The gross
nominal interest rate rn











The parameter ρm measures the degree of interest rate smoothing and is included following the
empirical evidence presented in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000). The parameters γπ and γy are
the response coeﬃcients of inﬂation and output. Finally, εm
t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
4M o d e l d y n a m i c s
The dynamics of the model are obtained by taking a log-linear approximation of equations (6), (7),
(8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (21), (25), (28), (29), (30), (31), (36), (37), (39), (40), (41),
(42), (43), (44) around a deterministic steady state, with zero inﬂation. In what follows variables
with a “hat” denote log-deviations from the steady state value, while variables without a time
subscript denote steady state values.
Taylor-type interest rate rule
b r n
t = ρmb r n
t−1 +( 1− ρm)γππt +( 1− ρm)γyb yt + εm
t (45)
Euler equation
b λt = Etb λt+1 + b rt (46)
Marginal utility of consumption











b rt = b r n
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February 2004b xt = φb ht − b λt (49)
Phillips curve
πt = ϕxb xt + ϕfEtπt+1 + ϕbπt−1 (50)
where ϕx =
(1−βϕ)(1−ϕ)(1−ω), ϕf =
βϕ, ϕb = ω and κ = ϕ + ω[1 − ϕ(1 − β)]
Resource constraint
b yt = b ct (51)
Market clearing





b mt = σb ut +( 1− σ)b vt (53)
Transition probabilities
b qt = b mt − b vt (54)
b st = b mt − b ut (55)
Market tightness
b θt = b vt − b ut (56)
Employment
b nt =( 1− ρ)b nt−1 +( 1− ρ)ηF,ab at−1 + ρb mt−1 (57)
Searching workers









b qt = −ν1
³
b xt+1 +b ht+1
´
+ β (1 − ρ)ηsb θt+1 + β (1 − ρ) b qt+1 − (1 + ν2)b λt+1 + b λt (59)
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b xt + b ht
´
− (1 − η)
a
λ






b qt = 0 (60)
where ς =( 1− η)
φ
1+φxh
J o bc r e a t i o nr a t e
b jct = χ(b mt − b nt)+( 1− χ) b qt (61)
where χ = 1




b jdt = −χ
1 − ρ
ρ
ηF,ab at +( 1− χ) b qt (62)
The model presented in this paper nests a baseline new keynesian model with a frictionless and
competitive labor market. The baseline model can be obtained by assuming that the rates of job
creation and job destruction are constant at their steady state values. This implies that all labor
market variables speciﬁc to the search and matching framework are also constant at their steady
state values.25 The baseline sticky prices model, then, is described by equations (45), (46), (47),
(48), (49), (50), (51) and (52), where in equation (52) b nt and b at are both equal to zero.
This has the extremely convenient implication that the two models can be easily comparable.
In particular, any diﬀerence in the dynamics of those variables that belong to both models must
be associated with the dynamics of job creation and job destruction that, in turn, determine the
dynamics of employment.
5 Bringing the model to the data
In this Section I describe the econometric methodology that I use to evaluate the model developed
in Section 3. The model parameters can be divided in three groups. The ﬁrst group is composed by




. The second group
is given by the structural parameters that aﬀect the dynamics of both the search model and the
baseline new keynesian model. This group is given by {β,φ,κh,e,ε,ϕ,ω}. The third group includes
the structural parameters that describe the labor market in the search model. This group does not
aﬀect the dynamics of the baseline model and is composed by {ρ,α,σ,q,η,n,µa,σa}.26
25These variables are nt, ut, mt, st, qt, at, vt and θt.





Working Paper Series No. 304
February 2004First, I set the Taylor rule parameters as follows: the interest rate smoothing parameter ρm is
set to be equal to 0.85, and the parameters γπ and γy to 1.5a n d0 .5, respectively. These values
are roughly consistent with the estimates presented in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000).
Second, I calibrate the parameters of the second group, with the exception of the habit per-
sistence parameter e. Speciﬁcally, I set the quarterly discount factor β to 0.99, which implies a
quarterly real rate of interest of approximately 1 percent. In order to calibrate the parameter φ,
note ﬁr s tt h a t1 /φ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. The value of this elas-
ticity has been a substantial source of controversy in the literature. Most microeconomic studies
estimates this elasticity to be small, close to 0 and not higher than 0.5.27 Students of the business
cycle, however, tend to work with elasticities that are much higher than microeconomic estimates,
typically unity and above. In such a way they can approximate the absence of the extensive margin
variation of the labor input. Since the model that I develop in this paper can account for both
margins, I accordingly set φ equal to 10, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
0.1. I then choose κh so that the time spent working in the steady state, h,i se q u a lt o1 /3. Then,
I set the probability that a ﬁrm does not change its price within a given period, ϕ,e q u a lt o0 .85,
implying that the average period between price adjustments is around 6.5 quarters. The fraction
ω of backward-looking retailers is set to 0.5. Both values are consistent with the estimates in Gal´ ı
and Gertler (1999).28 Finally, I assume that the markup of prices on marginal costs is on average
10 percent. This amounts to setting ε equal to 11.
Third, I estimate most of the structural parameters that characterize the labor market in the
search model. Moreover, since the habit persistence parameter is important to explain the dynamics
of the labor market, I include it in the group of parameters to be estimated. The following two
sections describe the estimation procedure and results.
5.1 Minimum distance estimation
I follow the estimation strategy adopted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Gilchrist and Williams
(2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Amato and Laubach (2003) and Boivin and
Giannoni (2003). This strategy can be seen as an application of the minimum distance estimation.
Speciﬁcally, the structural parameters are chosen so that the impulse responses to the monetary
shock of the endogenous variables in the model match as closely as possible the responses estimated
from the VAR.
More formally, denote with Ψ the vector of structural labor-market parameters to be estimated
27For a survey of the literature see Card (1994).
28It is important to point out that it is not necessary to rely on such high values of the parameters ϕ and ω to
explain inﬂa t i o nd y n a m i c si nt h ed a t a .I np a r t i c u l a r ,Ic o u l da l l o w for heterogeneous labor services as in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and, everything else equal, signiﬁcantly reduce the value of
both parameters. However, for clarity of presentation and analogously to Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), I do not include in
the model this additional feature. Moreover, as I discuss below, the important result is that for given values of ϕ and
ω, whichever values I assume, the response of inﬂation is much smaller than in the baseline new keynesian model.
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February 2004and with gM (Ψ) the vector-valued function containing the model-based impulse response functions.
Then, denote with Φ the vector of the estimated VAR coeﬃcients and with gV (Φ) the vector-valued
function containing the VAR-based impulse response functions. The minimum distance estimator,
b Ψ, can be obtained by minimizing the objective function
L(Ψ)=[ gM (Ψ) − gV (Φ)]
0 Λ[gM (Ψ) − gV (Φ)],
with respect to Ψ and subject to the theoretical constraints on the values of the parameters. In
the objective function, Λ denotes a diagonal weighting matrix with the inverse of each impulse
response’s variance along the diagonal. The choice of this weighting matrix eﬀectively takes into
account that some of the points estimates of the impulse responses are less accurate than others.
Finally, I consider in the estimation the impulse responses of the variables rn
t , yt, πt, nt, ht, jct and
jdt over the ﬁrst twenty periods after the monetary policy shock.
As Dridi, Guay and Renault (2003) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003) point out, although this
estimation strategy is similar in the spirit to a calibration exercise, it produces consistent estimates
of the structural parameters on which it is possible to perform statistical inference. These authors
also argue that, since the structural model cannot explain all features of the data, it should be
estimated only on the basis of some well-chosen moments of the data, which are consistent with
the main purpose of the model. Given that the main goal of this study is to explain the response
of the economy to a monetary policy shock, the estimation based on the impulse responses permits
to focus on the moments of the data that the model seeks to explain.
Among the labor market parameters, three of them can be easily calibrated from the data. In
particular, the empirical literature provides us with several measures of the US worker separation
rate. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) compute a quarterly worker separation rate of about 8
percent, while Hall (1995) reports this rate to be between 8 and 10 percent. Accordingly, I set the
overall separation rate ρ to 0.08. In order to calibrate α, I follow den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000). First, as previously discussed, they assume that only exogenous separations are reposted.
Then, based on evidence reported by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, they calculate that the rate at
which separations are reposted by ﬁr m si se q u a lt o0 .68. This implies that α =0 .68 and ρx =0 .054.
Then, I set the steady state probability that a ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy, q, to be equal to 0.7, as in Cooley
and Quadrini (1999) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). This value imply that the average
time a vacancy is ﬁlled is 1.4 quarters. The vector of parameters to be estimated, then, is given
by Ψ =[ σ,η,n,e,µa,σa]. Finally, it may seem reasonable to calibrate from the data also n,t h e
steady state employment rate. Below I discuss why I choose to estimate this steady state value.
5.2 Estimation results
The estimates of the parameters σ, η, n, e, µa and σa are reported in Table 1, along with the
corresponding standard errors. I perform the estimation in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage I estimate
all six parameters. The results are reported in the second column of Table 1. The elasticity of new
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February 2004matches with respect to the number of searching workers, σ,i se s t i m a t e dt ob e0 .56. This value is
higher but not too far from the estimate of 0.4 obtained by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and it
is consistent with the evidence summarized by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The estimate of the habit persistence parameter, e,i s0 .55. This is close to the estimate of 0.63
reported in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001). As previously mentioned, besides helping
the model to reproduce the hump-shaped responses of output and consumption, the presence of
habit formation in preferences also enhances the ability of the model to account for the joint
response of the extensive and intensive margins of variation of the labor input. Without habit
persistence, in particular, the initial response of hours per worker would be signiﬁcantly higher,
although still as transitory as in the data.
Table 1: Estimates of structural labor-market parameters
Parameters Estimates I Estimates II Estimates III
σ 0.558 0.558 0.545
(0.0843) (0.0448) (0.0311)
η 0.1 0.102 0.5
(1.0098) (0.8568) (−)
n 0.753 0.753 0.747
(0.0396) (0.0107) (0.0112)
e 0.549 0.549 0.55
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0062)
µa 2.86e-009 0 0
(0.4723) (−) (−)
σa 0.410 0.410 0.382
(0.1170) (0.0769) (0.0095)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. (−) denotes that the standard error is not available
because the parameter is calibrated.
T h er e a s o nw h yIc h o o s et oe s t i m a t et h es t e a d ys t a t ee m p l o y m e n tr a t i on is that on one hand
it may have considerable eﬀects on the dynamics of the labor market, on the other there is no
unambiguous way to calibrate it from the data. More precisely, as an example, Andolfatto (1996)
sets the employment rate n to 0.54, while den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) set it to 0.89.
These values, which are obviously larger than in the data, can be justiﬁed by interpreting the
unmatched workers in the model as being both unemployed and partly out of the labor force.
This interpretation is consistent with the abstraction in the model from labor force participation
decisions. Another way to rationalize a lower value for n is the following. It is assumed in order to
capture labor force participation changes. When the steady state fraction of searchers is low, the
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percentage increase in the numbers of workers looking for a job. This, in turn, raises signiﬁcantly
the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy. In reality, however, a lower probability of ﬁnding a job reduces
the labor force participation. In that case, a decrease in the number of employed people does not
necessarily translates in a one-to-one increase in the number of people searching for a job. As a
result, the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy may increase by a lower amount. A possible way to take
this labor force participation eﬀect into account is to assume a higher steady state value for the
fraction of searching workers. The estimate of n that I obtain is 0.75. This estimate lies between
the value used by Andolfatto (1996) and that used by den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
T h er e l a t i v eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r ,η, is estimated to be 0.1. However, this parameter is not very
precisely estimated. This may suggest that η does not have a large eﬀect on the dynamics of the
model. I return on this point below. Finally, the estimate of the parameter µa of the lognormal
is driven to 0 and the estimate of the parameter σa is 0.41.29 These values, in turn, determine
the steady state value of the threshold, a, and the elasticity of the survival rate to changes in
the threshold, ηF,a, from the steady state relationships. The implied values for a and ηF,a are,
respectively, 2.2a n d0 .17.
In the second stage of the estimation, I set the value of µa to 0 and estimate σ, η, n, e and
σa. The results are reported in the third column of Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the
new estimates are the same as the estimates in the ﬁrst stage, only the standard errors are lower.
However, the bargaining power η remains imprecisely estimated. For this reason, in the third stage
Is i m p l ys e tη to 0.5 - a value that assigns equal bargaining power to the worker and the ﬁrm - and
estimate σ, n, e and σa. The fourth column of Table 1 reports the estimation results and shows
that the estimates of all parameters are almost unaﬀected by setting η to 0.5. This conﬁrms the
above suggestion that the bargaining power has a negligible impact on the dynamic behavior of the
model. The reason why it is so is that with Nash bargaining the real wage plays only a distributive
role. In other words, although the dynamic behavior of the real wage is aﬀected by η, the model
dynamics are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the behavior of the real wage.30
Finally, given the above estimates, the steady state probability that a worker ﬁnds a job, s, is
calculated from the steady state relationships to be 0.2. This value imply that the average time
aw o r k e rﬁnds a job is 5 quarters. The parameters κ and b are also derived from the steady state
calculation and are equal to 0.4a n d0 .03, respectively.
29The values of the mean and the variance of at c a nt h e nb ec a l c u l a t e dt ob e1 .1a n d0 .2, respectively.
30In Trigari (2003), within a similar model to the one developed here, I study an alternative bargaining model to
the Nash bargaining and show that in this case the wage is allocative. As a consequence, the bargaining power η
becomes important to explain the model dynamics.
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First, I compare the predictions of the model developed in this paper - which I will refer to, for
simplicity, as the search model - with those of the baseline new keynesian model.
Figure 3 shows the response of several variables to a monetary shock. The monetary shock is
a one percent increase in the nominal interest rate.31 For each variable I plot the response in the
search model and the baseline model. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, output, inﬂation, marginal
costs and hours have a similar qualitative response in the two models. Note that, for comparison
reasons, in the search model I plot hours per worker rather than total hours. In both models, a
raise in the nominal interest rate causes an increase in the real interest rate because there are price
rigidities. As a consequence of the raise in the real interest rate, aggregate demand, output of
ﬁnal goods and hours worked decrease. The fall in output and hours can only occur at decreased
marginal costs. Finally, because prices are set based on expected future marginal costs, inﬂation
decreases. Therefore, the two models are observationally equivalent. That is, the introduction of
search frictions does not change the nature of the baseline model dynamics.















































Figure 3: Search versus new keynesian model
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diﬀerently. In the search model the response of inﬂation is signiﬁcantly less volatile. The response of
output is larger and more persistent. This happens because the search model implies a substantially
lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. The ﬁgure shows that a given fall in output
is associated with a much lower decrease in the level of marginal costs than in the baseline model.
In turn, smaller variations in marginal costs induce ﬁrms setting their prices to make smaller
adjustments in prices. This increases the sluggishness of the aggregate price level to changes in
aggregate demand and reduces the volatility of inﬂation. In particular, while in the baseline model
a peak decrease in output of about 0.23 percent is associated with a peak fall in inﬂation of around
0.63 percent, in the search model output falls by about 0.33 percent and inﬂa t i o nb yo n l y0 .27
percent. Finally, the lower sensitivity of the price level to variations in aggregate demand raises the
persistence of the response of aggregate demand and output to a monetary shock. In the baseline
model output goes back to its steady state value after 9 quarters, while in the search model it takes
around 18 quarters.











Figure 4: Extensive and intensive margin
The elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output is lower in the search model for two
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without changed marginal costs. To see this, write the log-linearized real marginal cost as b xt =
φb ht − b λt, from equation (49). This implies that changes at the intensive margin cause changes
in marginal costs according to the parameter φ, while changes at the extensive margin do not
aﬀect marginal costs.32 This happens because variations in hours per worker involve changes in
the disutility cost from supplying labor, while changes in employment only represent changes in
the economy’s capacity level. In the baseline model, instead, all changes in the labor input occur
at the intensive margin and aﬀect marginal cost as above, proportionally to φ. Now note that ﬁnal
output is given by b yt = b ht in the baseline model and b yt = b ht + b na
t in the search model, with b na
t
denoting active employment in t.33 Substituting, then, hours for ﬁnal output in the expression
for marginal cost gives b xt = φb yt − b λt and b xt = φ(b yt − b na
t) − b λt, respectively. These expressions
imply that a given change in output causes a lower change in marginal cost in the search model.
Marginal costs are lower by exactly the change in active employment, weighted by φ. Secondly, the
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output in the search model will be lower the larger is the
share of the ﬂuctuation in total hours that takes the form of ﬂuctuations in the number of people
working rather than changes in the hours by employed workers. Figure 4 plots the responses of
total hours, active employment and hours per worker in the search model. The percent change in
total hours is the sum of percent changes in employment and hours per worker. The ﬁgure shows
that the decrease in the number of people working is signiﬁcantly larger and more persistent than
the fall in the hours per worker. Initially, the fall in the demand for intermediate goods reduces
its relative price and reduces hours per worker. At the same time, the lower proﬁtability of ﬁrms
induces less ﬁrms to post vacancies and more ﬁrms to separate from their workers. As the number
of intermediate goods ﬁrms producing gradually decreases, the demand of intermediate goods per
ﬁrm gradually increases. As a consequence, the responses of output per ﬁrm and hours of work in
the intermediate goods sector are reverted fairly quickly.
It must be emphasized that I have assumed a degree of intertemporal substitution in the supply
of hours that is consistent with microeconomic estimates. Instead, general equilibrium models of
the business cycle, among which sticky prices models, tend to assume much higher values of this
elasticity, typically unit and above. By doing so, they can approximate some implications of the
model with both margins of adjustment. Of course, such model cannot explain what drives ﬂuctu-
ations in employment as opposed to hours per worker, why there is unemployment in equilibrium
or, more generally, the behavior of the labor market over the business cycle.
Figure 5 presents the dynamics of the labor market in the search model after a monetary
policy shock. The response of employment is explained by the dynamics of job creation and job




t, is the number of employed people actually working in period t and it is diﬀerent from
nt, the number of employed people at the beginning of period t.I n p a r t i c u l a r , n
a
t is given by: n
a
t =( 1− ρt)nt =
(1 − ρ
x)F (at)nt. Log-linearizing, we obtain: b n
a
t = b nt + ηF,ab at
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the mirror of the response of employment. Recall, from equation (32), that employment growth is
given by
nt+1−nt
nt = jct − jdt. Thus, employment falls if job creation is lower than job destruction.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, a contractionary monetary shock decreases job creation and raises
job destruction. The raise in job destruction is slightly greater and signiﬁcantly more persistent
than the decrease in job creation. Thus, most of the decrease in employment is due to the response
of job destruction, rather than job creation. In particular, while the reduction in job destruction
persists for nine periods, job creation raises above the steady state in the fourth period and above
the job destruction rate in the ﬁfth period. This implies that from the sixth period on employment
begins to raise and unemployment to decline.
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Figure 5: Labor-market dynamics
The responses of job creation and destruction, in turn, can be explained as follows. A persistent
raise in the nominal interest rate causes a decrease in current and expected future aggregate demand.
The fall in aggregate demand, in turn, decreases the demand for intermediate goods and the proﬁts
of ﬁrms producing them. This diminishes the value of the idiosyncratic shock above which the ﬁrm
and the worker decide to separate and raises the separation rate. Because of the timing assumption,
the monetary shock only aﬀects the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock and the separation
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induces ﬁrms to post less vacancies. The decrease in the number of posted vacancies diminishes
both the number of new matches and the job creation rate. Again, the number of vacancies and
the job creation rate respond to the monetary shock with a two-period delay.
The decrease in the number of posted vacancies and the increase in the number of searching
workers cause the labor market tightness to decrease. Thus, the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy raises
while the probability of ﬁnding a job drops. The higher probability of hiring a worker increases the
attractiveness of hiring activities and the expected future value of a match. Therefore, job creation
starts to increase and job destruction to fall.





















Figure 6: Estimated versus model responses
Figure 6 plots the model impulse responses of output, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate to
the monetary shock against the estimated impulse responses in the US economy. Figure 7 plots the
model responses of employment, hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate
against the estimated responses in the US economy. The solid and dashed lines denote, respectively,
the estimated impulse responses and the two standard deviations conﬁdence intervals, while the
lines with circles denote the simulated responses in the model.34 As Figure 6 and 7 show, the model
34Again, even if the equations in the model involve quarterly inﬂation and nominal interest rates, for clarity and
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February 2004does a good job in accounting for the dynamic response of the US economy to a monetary policy
shock.






























Figure 7: Estimated versus model responses
The ﬁrst dimension in which the model can reproduce the data is the joint dynamic behavior
of output and inﬂation. Basically, the simulated responses of output and inﬂation are everywhere
within the respective conﬁdence intervals. However, while the model generates signiﬁcantly more
persistence in output than the baseline new keynesian model, Figure 6 suggests that output is not
yet as persistent as in the data. Second, the model is able to reproduce the quantitative behavior
of the variation of the labor input at both margins of adjustment. It generates a small, transitory
fall in hours per worker together with a larger, more persistent fall in employment.35 Likewise the
response of output, however, the response of employment is less persistent than in the data. Third,
the model explains the joint behavior of job creation and job destruction. In particular, it can
account for the larger response of job destruction than job creation and for the observed upturn
in job creation. This upturn occurs because the larger pool of unemployed workers looking for a
comparison reasons I plot the annualized inﬂation and nominal interest rates.
35Note that in Figure 7, diﬀerently from Figure 5, I plot the model response of active employment. Conceptually,
this is the right measure of employment to be compared with the data.
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persistence in job destruction with respect to job creation that is observed in the data. Note, ﬁnally,
that the simulated impulse responses of all four labor market variables are everywhere within the
respective conﬁdence intervals.
7 Conclusions
This paper builds on the new keynesian theory of money and inﬂa t i o na n dt h em o d e r nt h e o r yo f
equilibrium unemployment. Both theories have been introduced previously in the macroeconomic
literature and extensively used for both normative and positive analysis. But the combination of
these theories into a single dynamic general equilibrium model provides new insights on the linkages
between money, business cycle ﬂuctuations and the dynamics of the labor market.
There are three basic ﬁndings. The ﬁrst concern the estimation results. I obtain consistent
estimates of a set of structural parameters that characterize the labor market, on which there is
few or no independent evidence. When previous estimates are available, the estimates that I obtain
are consistent with the previous ones. The second ﬁnding concerns the cyclical behavior of the
labor market when money is the driving force behind aggregate ﬂuctuations. The paper shows
that the demand-side channel of monetary transmission seems to be a good candidate to explain
the ﬂuctuations in employment and job ﬂows over the business cycle. The third ﬁnding concerns
the role of labor market dynamics in shaping the joint dynamics of output and inﬂation. These
variables are the focus of the recent literature that analyzes the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
in the presence of nominal price rigidities. The results indicate that, when labor market search is
incorporated into a standard new keynesian model, the ability of the model to explain the response
of output and inﬂation improves along a number of dimensions. In general, the estimated model
does a very good job in accounting quantitatively for the response of the US economy to a monetary
shock.
The ultimate objective of developing quantitative monetary general equilibrium models of the
business cycle is to design an optimal, or at least desirable, monetary policy. The model developed
in this paper could then be used to perform a welfare analysis of the consequences of alternative
monetary policies. In particular, the model provides the basis for thinking about the implications
of diﬀerent labor market policy regimes for the optimal monetary policy. I plan to explore these
issues in future research.
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Derivation of the surplus from employment for a worker
This section of the Appendix shows how the surplus from employment for a worker - the
diﬀerence between the employment and unemployment values - can be obtained from the family’s
problem. In this way, it is possible to rationalize the existence of bargaining between workers and
ﬁrms when workers are perfectly insured against the risk of being unemployed, as it is assumed in
the paper. The argument is based on the assumption that workers value their actions in terms of
the contribution these actions give to the utility of the family to which they belong. This implies
that the surplus from employment for a worker can be deﬁned as the change in the family’s utility
from having one additional member employed.
Suppose that there is a continuum of identical families indexed on the unit interval. Each of
these families has a continuum of members indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. A fraction na
t of these members is
employed, while the remaining fraction 1−na
t is unemployed. Recall that na
t denotes the number of
individuals that are actually working in period t.T h i si sd i ﬀerent from nt, the number of individuals
that are employed at the beginning of period t, previously to the realization of the idiosyncratic













| ait+1 ≤ at+1
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(63)
Note that the family’s disutility from having a fraction na
t of its members supplying hours of
work, previously denoted with Gt, is made explicit in (63) and is equal to
R na
t g(ht,a it)di.T h e
symbol ait denotes the idiosyncratic shocks to the individual i’s disutility from working.
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where the per capita family’s income, previously denoted with dt, is the sum of the ﬁrst three
terms on the right-hand side of the budget constraint. More precisely, the family obtains income
from having a fraction na
t of its members working at the hourly wage wt (ait) and a fraction 1−na
t
producing at home a non-tradable output b of ﬁnal goods. Finally, δt denotes the family’s per
capita share of aggregate proﬁts from retailers and intermediate goods ﬁrms, net of the vacancy
posting costs.













where the representative family takes as given the probability st at which the search activity by
the unemployed members leads to a job match.
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t (ait) the surplus from employment for a worker. As previously said, this is









Taking the derivative of Ωt in (63) with respect to na
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(67)
The surplus from employment, then, is given by the following expression:
e SW
















where the index i is omitted for simplicity.
Finally, denote with SW
t (at) the value of the surplus from employment in terms of current







After substituting into the above identity the expression for e SW
t (at) and rearranging, the value





















This equation corresponds to the diﬀerence between the value of employment (17) and the value
of unemployment (18) that are reported in the paper.
Identifying monetary policy shocks
In this section of the Appendix I brieﬂy describe the identiﬁcation strategy of the monetary
policy shock. Following Christiano et al. (2000), and others, I assume that the central bank
conducts its monetary policy following a simple reaction function. More precisely, in each period t,
the policymaker sets its instrument - the short-term nominal rate rn
t - in a systematic way using a
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t is the monetary policy shock. The identiﬁcation scheme is
based on the recursiveness assumption, according to which monetary policy shocks are orthogonal
to the information set of the monetary authority, It.
Let yt denote the (n × 1) vector of the variables included in the analysis, i.e., the instrument
and the variables in the information set of the monetary authority. The vector yt is partitioned
so that the monetary policy instrument is ordered last, in the nth position. Then, the dynamic
behavior of yt is assumed to be represented by the following VAR of order p:
yt = c + A1yt−1 + ... + Apyt−p + Bεt, (72)
where c is a (n × 1) vector of constants, the Ai’s are (n × n)m a t r i c e so fc o e ﬃcients, B is a (n × n)
lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal elements and εt is a (n × 1) vector of mutually and
serially uncorrelated structural shocks with zero mean and constant variance. The nth element of
εt is the monetary policy shock, εm
t . The lower-triangularity of B implies that all variables in the
information set are assumed to be predetermined with respect to the monetary policy shock.
Equivalently, we can write:
A(L)yt = c + Bεt, (73)
where A(L)=[ In − A1L − ... − ApLp]a n dL in the lag operator. Using OLS, we can estimate the
coeﬃcient matrices A(L),c ,Band the variance-covariance matrix of εt.
Given these estimates, the impulse responses functions to a monetary shock of the variables
belonging to yt can be obtained from the inﬁnite Moving Average (MA) representation of the
structural VAR. This is given by:
yt − y = H (L)εt, (74)
where y =[ A(L)]
−1 c is the unconditional mean of yt and H (L)=[ A(L)]
−1 B embeds the impulse
response coeﬃcients.
Equivalently, we have:
b yt = εt + H1εt−1 + H2εt−2 + ... + Hsεt−s + ..., (75)
where H(L)=[ In + H1L + ... + HpLp + ...]a n db yt = yt − y is the deviation of yt from its uncon-
ditional mean. In particular, a plot of the (i,n)
th element of Hs as a function of s is the estimated
impulse response function of b yit to a monetary shock, for any variable i in yt.36 This dynamic path
is invariant to the ordering of the variables contained in It.
36In practice, the sum in (75) is truncated at a large but ﬁnite lag.
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